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returns and would
to defeat the
statute. It follows that the trial court
not err in refusing to require
of
of either the state or
federal tax returns.
The judgment is affirmed.
Carter,
and
J. pro tern.,• concurred.

McComb, J.,

Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied January
23, 1958. Bray, J. pro tern.,* participated therein in place
of Shenk, J.

[L. A. No. 24185.

In Bank.

Dec. 31, 1957.]

Estate of EMMA C. HEARD, Deceased. BANK OF AMERICA NATIONAL 'fRUST AND SAVINGS ASSOCIATION (a National Banking A8sociation), as '£ru8tee, etc.,
Petitioner v. 1\WS'l' WORSHIPFUL GRAND LODGE
OF FREE AND ACCEP'l'ED MASONS (an fTnincorporated Association) et al., Appellants; SHIRLEY T.
HEARD, as Guardian, etc., Respondent.
[1] Wills-Designation of Takers-"Children."-The term "children" in a will may include adopted children though adopted
after testator's death.
[2] Adoption-Inheritance by Adopted Child.-Wills must be read
and construed in harmony with the legislative policy of placing adopted children on a level with natural born offspring.
[3] Wills-Designation of Takers-''Issue."---The word "issue"
includes all descendants, and since the statute gives to an
adopted child the status of a descendant, all the legal consequences and incidents thereof follow, the same as though the
child was born in lawful wedlock.
[1] Adopted child as within class in testamentary gift, notes,
70 A.L.R. 621; 144 A.L.R. 670. See also Cal.Jur., Wills, § 247;
Am.Jur., Wills, § 1363.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Wills, § 329; [2] Adoption, § 39; [3,
8] Wills, § 325; [4] Contracts, § 141; [5, 7] Wills, § 266; [6]
Wills, § 330.
*Assigned by Chairman of J udieial Council.
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Contracts-Interpretation-Meaning of Words.-Words in a
private instrument should ordinarily, in the absence of a
showing of contrary intent, be given the effect given them by
statutory or ease law.
[5] Wills-Construction.-Testamentary provisions should be construed as far as
in harmony with law and
[6] !d.-Designation of Takers-"Adopted" Children.-The Supreme Court cannot suppose that wills are made in a vacuum,
that the status of an adopted child, being the same as a biological offspring, may be completely ignored, or that it was
ignored by a testator when making a will any more than he
may be said to ignore other rules of law and public policy;
when he has not said anything about "adopted" children,
using that word or the equivalent, the court must assume, unless a contrary intent is expressed, that his will would be
compatible with the general body of law and public policy.
[7] Id.-Construction.-Courts by necessity draw on statutes, case
law and public policy in construing an instrument, such as a
will, since they must suppose that the draftsman did not
intend to pursue a course contrary to them unless he so states.
[8] !d.-Designation of Takers-"Lawful Issue."-A testamentary disposition of the residue of a trust to the "lawful issue"
of testatrix' son, if he he deceased, includes his adopted child
in the absence of anything to show a contrary intent, in view
of the public policy to treat adopted children the same as
blood children; the fact that prior to the 1955 amendment of
Prob. Code, § 257, it had been indicated that adopted children
inherit from but not through their adoptive parents is not
significant.

APPEALS from an order of the Superior Court of Kern
County instructing a testamentary trustee. Robert B. Lambert, ,Judge. Affirmed.
No appearance for Petitioner.
Henry C. Clausen, Henry C. Clausen, Jr., Thomas .J. Cunningham, John E. Landon and William R. Hulsey for Appellants.
Couron, Heard & James and Calvin H. Couron, Jr., for
Respondent.
[ 4] See Cal.Jur.2d, Contracts, § 142 et seq.; Am.Jur., Contracts,

§ 236 et seq.
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CARTER J.-Emma Heard, testatrix, a widow, died on
November 23, 1939, leaving a will dated September 28, 1935.
At the time of her death her blood relatives were a brother
and a son, John, who was 42 years old, married to a woman
36 years old, but with no children. (He had been married
before and
She left a small bequest to her brother
and others
John, but the major portion of her
estate she left to the Bank of America, National Trust and
Savings Association (also named executor), in trust to pay
from the income: $200 per month for life to John; $50
per month to JYirs. Cummings (testatrix' cousin) for life;
$25 to one Rice for life; $50 to a servant, Eulalia, for life;
$25 a month for the care of a dog; the remainder of the
income was to be paid monthly to John ''or if he be deceased,
then to his lawful issue, if any, distributed per stirpes and
not per capita" but if John should "leave no lawful issue
at the time of his death" then the income shall be paid to
May Cummings until her death and then to her "living
issue. " 1 If the income is not sufficient to pay all the payments above mentioned, the income should first be paid to
John "or in case of his death to his lawful issue." If the
income payable to John is not sufficient to provide for his
needs, the trustee may make additional payments from the
corpus and the same is true as to the ''lawful issue'' of John
if he should die before the termination of the trust.
The trust shall terminate on the death of the "last survivor of all," the persons, that is Rice, May Cumming's
issue and including the "lawful issue" of John who may be
living when the testatrix dies and the cessation of Eulalia's
employment during testatrix' life. Upon the termination of
the trust, the corpus is to be "forthwith and outright paid
over and delivered to the heirs of the lawful issue" of John
but if "at" the termination of the trust "there should not
then be living any lawful issue of" ,John, then the residue
shall be paid over to appellants herein. There are spendthrift provisions, a contest clause, and a specification of the
trustee's powers and compensation.
The trustee petitioned for instructions under section 1120
of the Probate CodE' 2 on how thE' property sl1onld be dis'In separate paragraphs it is provided that "Upon the death" of John
"the residue of income shall be distributed among his lawful issue, if
any, by right of representation," and if no i~sue the "accrued" income
to May Cummings.
'"When a trust created by a will continues after distribution, the
superior court shall not lose jurisdiction of the estate by final distribu·

617
trilmted and it appears from the
that John died on
1955;
died but her issue are still
alive; Eulalia was not employed by testatrix at the latter's
tl.:nth; Rice is still alive; the dog is dead; hence the trust
is not
terminated; and on October 19, 1950, John and
hi~ wife
in this state ,John III, respondent herein,
\n1s at that time about 7 years old, and his adoptive
wother appears herein as his guardian; that the testatrix,
reference to "lawful issue" of ,John intended to include
adopted children including rrspondent; that respondent is
entitled to the first $200 income; that the trust is not terminated, accordingly an order was entered instructing the
trustee to pay from the income $200 per month to respondent,
then $25 monthly to Rice and the balance to respondent.
Appellants 3 appeal from that order. \V"hile it is clear the
trust has not yet been terminated beeause Rice is still alive
and the appellants, children of May Cummings, are still alive.
who claim the income that was to go to John if he died
without lawful issue; and the other appellants appeal because
they feel the determination that respondent, .John's adopted
son, was John's lawful issue, thus excluding May Cummings'
two children from the income, might be res judicata on that
question when the trust is terminated.
This estate has been on appeal before in .Estate of Heard,
25 Cal.2d 322 [153 P.2d 553], which hrld the trust provisions
yalid and that the lawful issue of John would take on termination of the trust, and found invalid one paragraph of the
will, not here important. (See also .Estate of Heard, 107 Cal.
App.2d 225 [236 P.2d 810, 27 A.L.R.2d 1313].) Accounts
have been heretofore filed by the trustee and the estate was
distributed to the trustee on the trusts as stated in the will.
The sole issue presented is whether "lawful issue" of John
included a child he adopted after the will was made and the
testatrix was dead.
tion, but shall retain jurisilietion for the purpose of determining to whom
the property shall pass and be delivered upon final or partial termination of tbe trust, to the extent that sueh determination is not concluded
by the decree of distribution, of settling the a~counts and passing upon
the acts of the trustee and for the other purposes hereinafter set forth .
. . . The trustee may also petition such court, from time to time, for instructions as to the administration of the trust." (Pro b. Code, ~ 1120.)
An appeal may be taken from an order giving instructions. (Estate of
Charters, 46 Cal.2d 227 [293 P.2d 778] .)
"Three of appellants are the ones to receive the corpus of the trust
on its tennination if John left no lawful issue, the other two appellants
(May Cummings' issue) were to receive the income from the trust if
John died without lawful issue.
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In
whether John III was lawful issue in the
will it was stipulated that the will was drawn by a lawyer;
that appellants La Berge and Norris Cummings are the issue
of May and the second cousins of the testatrix. John was
married in 1933 before the will was made and testatrix died;
he was in ill health. The adoption of John III took place
later.
[1] The term "children" in a will may include adopted
children although adopted after the testa tor's death. (Estate
of Stanford, ante, p. 120 [315 P.2d 681]; Meek v. Ames,
177 Kan. 565 [280 P.2d 957] .) 'rhe same has been applied to
"heirs" (see Majm· v. Ilammer, - - Ky. - - [258 S.W.2d
506]); to "descendants, heirs or survivors" (Hayes v. St.
Louis Union Trttst Co., - - Mo. - - [280 S.W.2d 649] ; St.
Louis Union Trust Co. v.
- - Mo. - - [282
S.W.2d 474]); to "lawful issue" (see Riddle v. Peters Trust
Co., 147 Neb. 578 [24 N.W.2d 434]; see also 70 A.L.R. 621;
144 id. 670). It is said in In re Upjohn's Will, 304 N.Y.
366 [107 N.E.2d 492, 494]: "Embodied in our adoption
statute is the fundamental social concept that the relationship
of parent and child, with all the personal and property rights
incident to it may be established, independently of blood ties,
by operation of law . . . 'In the eye of the law, therefore,
adopted children are lineal descendants of their foster parent. They are in the line of descent from him through the
command of the statute, the same as if that line had been
established by nature.' Matter of Cook's Estate, 187 N.Y.
253, 261 [79 N.E. 991, 994]. In harmony with the legislative
policy thus expressed, the adoption statute has been most
liberally and beneficently applied. . . .
[2] ''Wills, too, must be read and construed in harmony
with the legislative policy of placing adopted children on a
level with natural born offspring. See Gnliam v. Gua.ranty
Trust Co., 186 N.Y. 127. 138 [78 N.E. 697, 700] ; Matter of
Ellis' Estate, 178 Misc. 491,492 [34 N.Y.S.2d 884, 885]." It
has been held with reference to the anti-lapse statute (see
Pro b. Code, § 92) that an adopted child is a ''lineal descendant" of his adoptive parents. (Estate of Esposito, 57 Cal.
App.2d 859 [135 P.2d 167] ; Estate of Tibbetts, 48 Cal.App.
2d 177 [119 P.2d 368) ; Estate of J!Ioore, 7 Cal.App.2d 722
[47 P.2d 533, 48 P.2d 28]; see Estate of Winchester, 140
Cal. 468 [74 P. 10].) [3] It is said in the Winchester case
at page 469: "In Pierce v. Rickard, 18 R.I. 142, it was held
that by the well-settled current of authority the word 'issue'
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includes aU
and as the statute gives to an
ch!ild the status
a descendant, all the ~egal conseqtwnces
and incidents thereof follow, the same as though the child was
born in lawful wed~ock. (Hartwell v. Tefft, 19 R.I. 646.)
In Warren v. Prescott, 84 Me. 483, it was held that a legally
child is a lineal descendant of its adopting parents
and if, as declared by the Civil Code, an adopted child is to
be 'regarded and treated in all respects as the child of the
person adopting,' and the two 'sustain towards each other
the legal relation of parent and child, and have all the rights
and be subject to all the duties of that relation,' it must
follow that the children of such adopted child take by inheritance as issue of the adopting father. [Citations.] Otherwise, the child adopted and the adopting parent would not
sustain towards each other the relation of parent and child.
[Citation.] In the Estate of Wardell, 57 CaL 491, it is said:
'The term "child" as used in Civil Code, section 1307, of the
law of descent and succession must relate to status, not to
origin.'" (Emphasis added.) Certainly some consideration
must be given to such construction of statutes when we are
considering private instruments.
We have pointed out in Estate of Stanford, ante, p. 120
[315 P.2d 681], the policy in this state to give to an adopted
child the same status as a biological one, and that the Estate of
Pierce, 32 Cal.2d 265 [196 P.2d 1], merely holds that there
was sufficient evidence aside from the face of the will to show
the testator intended lawful issue not to include adopted
children. At the time the will here involved was prepared
and at the time of the death of the testatrix section 257 of
the Probate Code provided: "An adopted child succeeds to the
estate of one who has adopted him, the same as a natural
child; and the person adopting succeeds to the estate of an
adopted child, the same as a natural parent. An adopted
child does not succeed to the estate of a natural parent when
the relationship between them has been severed by the adoption, nor does such natural parent succeed to the estate of
such adopted child.'' (But sec 1955 amendment to section
257 which broadens scope of inheritance by adopted child.)
In an excellent article by Professor Jacobus tenBroek (see
22 So.Cal.I.J.Rev. 89; 6 Hastings L.J. 261), it is pointed out
in detail the effect of adoption, its Rteady increase and the
necessity that an adopted child be treated the same as a
biological child of the adoptive parents, and it is said : ''If
the genetic connection is what is meant, then it must be noted
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that the act of transmission is
in a comparatively short time and does not necessarily involve any afte-rcontact or relationship. Is this 'natural relation' more natural or more important than the mutual, reciprocal and continuous relation between parent and child, which may occur
in adoptive or non-adoptive
involved in the rearing
of a child from infancy to
with all of the impact
of day-to-day care and upbringing upon character, psychology, outlook, emotional make-up, and even biology which
that entails¥ In this sense, does not nature 'do the work of
nature' and create one a child who by nature is a stranger T
In fact, in this sense, does not nature do the work of nature
and create one a child who by nature is not a stranger? . . .
"The over-all purpose of these sections, taken together
with Civil Code, Section 221, evidently was to create a new
legal relationship of parent and child which normally would
be coupled with the natural relation of parent and child
springing from the fact that that is the relationship in which
they actually live; and to make the new legal relationship
legally the same as the old legal relationship of parent and
child which normally is coupled both with the genetic and
the factual natural relation of parent and child. . . .
"In general, despite the persistent emergence of these
underlying conceptions, the California Supreme Court has
taken the statutory language seriously. It has held that:
the adoptive parent has the same right to paramount custody
as the biological parents anrl, after adoption, guardianship of
the adopted child is therefore improper. The residence of
the adopting parent becomes the residence of the child ;
adopted children are within the term 'any lineal descendant'
and are thus exempted from the burden of a collateral inheritance tax; an adopted child is a 'child' within the meaning
of Section 1365 of the Code of Civil Procedure and thus entitled to letters of administration of the estate of the adopting parent; a court having control of a child's custody by
virtue of the divorce of its parents is ousted of its jurisdiction
by adoption; 'an adoptive parent may contract with the
natural parents to take care of, support and educate the
adopted child for compensation as freely and legally as such
contract could be made by the adoptive parent with a stranger
to the blood of such child'; an adopted child is not part of
the immediate family of his biological father for the purpose
of having set aside as exempt property insurance proceeds
paid into the estate of such father.
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''The California
to the same
line with
and child. In In
7 Am.St.Rep.
] , the
from the adoptive
the adoption statutes.
'extend
' said the
natural
and children.
IS
The use of
section 1386,
does not limit the
of inheritance
the natural children
used
the same sense
only. . .. The word "issue" is
the words "child" and "children." ' . . .
it is
with respect to succession
the two natural relationand the
that 'natural
ship theories-the
inclinations and affections' derive from
experience
and contact-come into
conflict. On the family experience and contact
the relativrs of the adoptive
become the relatives of the
parents, lineal and
adopted child.
,
the
grandparents,
uncles, aunts, brothers, sisters and cousins he knows. His
genetic grandparents,
brothers. sisters and
other relatives in a sizable
of ea,,rs of illegitimate
birth will not even have been a;vare of his existence; and in
many other instances will lHlTe known him only very briefly
prior to his surrender for
a very young infant.
Moreover, even if property is to
genes, collaterals
inherit the genes
would have to
excluded since
were drawn from a
being followed but
common stock.
(but all
on the common family
other collateral relatives as well)
theory, must
experience and contact
be those of the adoptive
born before or after
the adoption or even if
( 6 Hastings
L.J. 261, 276.) [ 4] Moreover words in a private instrument should ordinarily, in the
of a showing of a contrary intent, be given the effect
them by the statutory
or case law.
§
; iV einreich Estate Co.
v. A. J. Johnston Co., 28
J46 r151 P. 667]) and
this is applied to wills:
provisions should
with law and public
be construed as far as
policy.•.. 'l'he testator
bound
know existing statutes
affecting testamentary dispositions. . .. " ( 95 C.J .S., Wills,
§ 589.) The same should be true as to whether lawful issue
includes adopted children: "In ascertaining the testator's in-
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0.2d
may be considered.
'issue' or 'lawful issue' may in~

"In some
in which statutes entitle the adopted
parents in the
child to succeed to the estate of the
same manner as if it had been a natural child of such parent
•.. the term
' as used in its
sense of lineal
descendants
will include an
child." (95
C.J.S., Wills, § 666
.)
We cannot suppose that
wills are made in a vacuum; that the status of an adopted
offspring, which is the
child being the same as a
public policy of the
may be completely ignored, or that
it was ignored by a testator when making a will any more
than he may be said to ignore many other rules of law and
public policy. When he has not said anything about
"adopted" children using that word or the equivalent, the
court in seeking his intent is in fact endeavoring to ascertain
what his wishes would be if adopted children were called
particularly to his mind. Lacking that, the court must assume, unless a contrary intent is expressed, that he intended
that his will would fit it and be compatible with the general
body of the law and public policy. Otherwise the court is
left with little if any basis for interpreting the instrument.
[7] Courts thus, by necessity, draw on the statutes, case law
and public policy in construing an instrument as they must
suppose that the draftsman did not intend to pursue a cours2
contrary to them unless he so states. The draftsman of wills
may exclude adopted persons if he wishes.
[8] While the will dors leave the bulk of the estate to
blood relatives, testatrix' cousin Mrs. Cnn mings, and her son
John, we do not find therein any indicEnion that an adopted
child was to be excluded in view of the public policy to treat
adopted children the same as blood children. Nor is it significant that prior to the 1955 amendment to section 257 of
the Probate Code it had been indicated that adopted children
inherit from but not through their adoptive parents (see
In re Darling, 173 Cal. 221 [159 P. 606]; Estate of Calhoun,
44 Cal.2d 378 [282 P.2d 880]). Assuming that is correct a'
to cases arising prior to the effective date of said amendment,
it affords no solution here where we are concerned not with inheritance but rather with whether the words ''lawful issue''
used in a will includes an adopted child. There is no morr
probability that a person will adopt a child than that he will
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of the same blood
does not assure them of a relative fitting their tastes. These
so nebulous afford no grounds for excluding
from the term "lawful issue."
The order is affirmed.
Dooling,
concurred.

Schauer, J., Peters, J. pro tern.,•
and Wood (Fred B.), J. pro tem.,•

[L.A. No. 24637.
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CARL H. PEARSON, Appellant, v. COUNTY OF LOS
ANGELES et al., Respondents.
[1] Pensions-Vested Right.-A public employe who serves under
pension provisions of a statute or ordinance providing for
pension payments to
who are eligible for retirement
after a designated
or term of service acquires a vested
contractual right to a substantial pension; surh right arises
before the
of the contingency whirh makes the
pension payable.
[2] Id.-Vested
employe may not be deprived of vested
contractual rights to a pension
by a procedure which
affords him due proces;;, including opportunity to be heard.
[1] Vested right of
9S A.L.R. 505; 112
2d, Pensions, § 11; Am.Jur.,
~licK. Dig. References:
§ 130;
8-11, 13-15]
(8), 130; f6] Counties,§ 4;
trative Lnw, § 3;

54 A,L,R. 943;
See also Cal.Jur.
Pensions, § 4; [3] Public Officers,
§ 35.2; [5] Public OfficPrs, §§ 32
§~ 31, 35; [ 12 J Arlminis·
§ 52.5; [17, 18] Counties, § 3'7.1,

"Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.

